Risk Shifting versus Risk Management: Investment Policy in Corporate Pension Plans
研究美国企业养老金计划中风险转移与风险管理激励对资产配置的影响，发现资金不足且信用评级低的企业更倾向投资安全资产，而资金充足且信用评级高的企业更倾向投资股票，风险管理动机比风险转移更能解释投资政策差异。
The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk-shifting and risk-management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in pooled regressions and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among firms in the United States.