The Bidder's Curse
研究发现在线拍卖中42%的拍卖价格高于同一网页上的固定价格，且该现象在更广泛的拍卖中复制（48%），主要由少数过度投标者（17%）驱动，表明有限注意力是主要原因。
We employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in auctions. We compare online auction prices to fixed prices for the same item on the same webpage. In detailed data on auctions of a board game, 42 percent of auctions exceed the simultaneous fixed price. The result replicates in a broad cross-section of auctions (48 percent overbidding). A small fraction of overbidders, 17 percent of bidders, suf fices to generate the large fraction of auctions with overbidding. We show that the observed behavior is inconsistent with rational behavior, even allowing for uncertainty about prices and switching costs, since the expected auction price also exceeds the fixed price. Limited attention best explains our results.