Third-party manipulation of conflict: an experiment
通过实验室实验，研究拥有私人信息的第三方如何通过公开信息影响冲突双方的选择，发现第三方沟通并非策略性，但鹰派或鸽派信息会改变冲突行为，且不受第三方激励影响。
Abstract We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public message to two conflicting players, who then make their choices. We find that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a hawkish message by a third party makes hawkish behavior more likely while a dovish message makes it less likely. Moreover, how subjects respond to the message is largely unaffected by the third party’s incentives. We argue that our results are consistent with a focal point interpretation in the spirit of Schelling.