Executive Bonus Target Ratcheting: Evidence from the New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules
利用美国证券交易委员会新披露规则下的强制披露数据，首次大样本检验了高管奖金目标是否根据过去业绩进行调整，发现目标存在不对称棘轮效应，且程度与股权激励和投资机会相关。
Abstract This study investigates whether firms revise executive bonus compensation targets based on past performance. Studies in this area suffer from a lack of detailed information related to executive performance targets. Using mandatory disclosures of executive compensation information under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's new disclosure rules, this study provides the first large‐sample evidence of bonus target ratcheting. There are three major findings: (i) executive bonus targets ratchet and they ratchet asymmetrically; (ii) the degree of target ratcheting and ratcheting asymmetry vary with executive equity incentives and investment opportunities; and (iii) performance relative to bonus target is serially correlated.