Common Ownership Does Not Have Anticompetitive Effects in the Airline Industry
重新评估了共同所有权与机票价格的正相关关系，发现该关系源于共同所有权衡量中的市场份额部分，而非所有权和控制部分，且结果对投资者控制衡量和破产期间假设敏感。
ABSTRACT Institutions often own equity in multiple firms that compete in the same product market. Prior research has shown that these institutional “common owners” induce anticompetitive pricing behavior in the airline industry. This paper reevaluates this evidence and shows that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and airline ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components. We further show that the results are sensitive to measures of investor control and to assumptions about equity holders' ownership and control during bankruptcy.