Public Disclosure and Dissimulation of Insider Trades
研究内幕交易者如何在强制披露规则下平衡即时收益与未来收益，提出掩饰性交易（与操纵不同）是内幕交易决策的新解释。
Regulation requiring insiders to publicly disclose their stock trades after the fact complicates the trading decisions of informed, rent-seeking insiders. Given this requirement, we present an insider's equilibrium trading strategy in a multiperiod rational expectations framework. Relative to Kyle (1985), price discovery is accelerated and insider profits are lower. The strategy balances immediate profits from informed trades against the reduction in future profits following trade disclosure and, hence, revelation of some of the insider's information. Our results offer a novel rationale for contrarian trading: dissimulation, a phenomenon distinct from manipulation, may underlie insiders' trading decisions.