Vote Trading and Information Aggregation
研究美国股权借贷市场中投票交易的现象，发现投票平均以零价格交易，且信息不对称驱动交易，交易更多发生在价差大、业绩差的公司，投票交易支持股东提案、反对管理层提案。
ABSTRACT The standard analysis of corporate governance assumes that shareholders vote in ratios that firms choose, such as one share‐one vote. However, if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders choose the ratios. We document an active market for votes within the U.S. equity loan market, where the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates the vote trade and find support in the cross section. More trading occurs for higher‐spread and worse‐performing firms, especially when voting is close. Vote trading corresponds to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals.