The strategic use of download limits by a monopoly platform
研究了互联网服务提供商和移动网络等平台为何提供有下载限制的套餐，发现这能促使内容提供商降价或提升质量，从而增加消费者剩余，平台再通过更高的接入费获利。
We offer a new explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobile‐phone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes content providers to reduce prices or improve quality. This generates greater surplus for consumers, which a platform captures via higher consumer access fees. Even accounting for congestion externalities, a platform limits downloads more than would be welfare maximizing; indeed, by so much, that barring such practices can be welfare superior to what a platform would do. Paradoxically, a platform will install more bandwidth when it can restrict downloads than when it cannot.