Anticipation, Acquisitions, and Bidder Returns: Industry Shocks and the Transfer of Information across Rivals
研究发现市场对并购竞标存在预期，预期较低的竞标公告回报更高；后续竞标方在首次行业竞标公告期间也有正异常回报，表明公告期回报低估了竞标财富效应，且收购公开目标公司和股票互换交易并非如传统观点所认为的损害股东财富。
We document market anticipation of merger bids and show that less anticipated bids earn significantly higher announcement returns. Subsequent bidders in the industry experience significant and positive abnormal returns around the time of initial industry bid announcements. These results suggest that announcement period returns underestimate the wealth effects of bidding. After accounting for anticipation, bidding activity is, on average, a significant wealth-creating event. Moreover, bidders pursuing public targets increase shareholder wealth and bidders in stock swaps do not lose. These results contradict conventional wisdom. Our results shed light on the correct magnitude of acquisition returns and on the transfer of information throughout an industry around the time of an economic shock. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.