THE ENDOGENEITY OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND CORPORATE FINANCING DECISIONS
研究发现公司通过选择与资本市场的沟通程度来内生化信息不对称，沟通越多越可能发行股票，且只有低沟通公司的增发公告会引发负面市场反应。
Firms endogenize the extent of information asymmetry by choosing the optimal level and channels of direct communication with the capital markets. Firms choose more communication when they have a greater potential demand for external financing (characterized by higher growth, less cash, and higher leverage). We demonstrate that a higher level of communication is associated with a higher probability of equity issuance. We further document that the previously observed negative market reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements is attributed only to low-communication firms; high-communication SEO firms experience no significant adverse market reaction.