On the Economics of Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation and Tenure: Evidence from PCAOB Data
研究了2008-2014年美国上市公司中审计合伙人任期和强制轮换对审计质量、定价和生产的影响，发现审计质量未随任期下降，强制轮换后审计费用降低但工时增加，且存在“影子”准备现象。
ABSTRACT We analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms during 2008–2014. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for “fresh-look” benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use “shadowing” in preparation for a lead partner turnover. These effects differ by competitiveness of the local audit market, client size, and partner experience. When multiple members of the audit team commence work at a new client, the transition appears to be more disruptive and more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. Our findings point to costly efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations. JEL Classifications: J01; J44; L84; M21; M42.