Long‐Lived Consumers, Intertemporal Bundling and Collusion
研究在消费者寿命长但有限的情况下，长期合同如何通过跨期捆绑减少窃取客户的收益，从而促进企业默契合谋，使合谋在更广泛的折现因子和市场结构下得以维持。
In a repeated price game with long but finitely‐lived consumers, long‐term contracts facilitate collusion. Intertemporal bundling reduces the gains from business stealing but has little effect on the cost of the resulting price war. When consumers anticipate future price wars, the maximum deviation profit is a single period of consumer surplus per consumer. Hence long‐term contracts do not increase the incentive to deviate per consumer, but do reduce the the number of consumers currently in the market by locking them into past contracts, so tacit collusion is sustainable for a wider range of discount factors and market structures.