The Initial Listing Decisions of Firms That Go Public
分析了符合纽交所上市条件的IPO的初始上市决策，发现公司倾向于与同行相同的交易所上市，且规模小、风险高的公司更可能选择纳斯达克以规避退市成本。
We analyze the initial listing decisions of IPOs that qualify for New York Stock Exchange listing.We find that IPOs are more likely to list on the exchange where their industry peers are listed.Further, reverse LBOs and carveouts are more likely to choose the NYSE if the firm or their parent was previously NYSE-listed.Consistent with avoidance of delisting costs, we find that smaller, riskier firms tend to list on Nasdaq.Although direct issue costs are higher on the NYSE than on Nasdaq, total issue costs do not differ across exchanges and are unlikely to affect the listing decision.Although direct issue costs are higher on the NYSE than on Nasdaq, total issue costs (including underpricing) do not differ across listing venues and are therefore unlikely to affect the listing decision.Our research follows earlier empirical studies that find a positive stock price reaction to exchange listing announcements (e.g., Sanger and McConnell, 1986;Grammatikos and Papaioannou, 1986;Kadlec and McConnell, 1994).These studies generally conclude that NYSE listing increases liquidity and may convey positive information about the firm.To analyze the motivations for listing decisions, Cowan, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1992) compare the characteristics of firms that move from Nasdaq to the NYSE with those that are NYSE-eligible but choose to stay on Nasdaq.Their results suggest that firms list on the NYSE to obtain a more liquid market for their stocks, but that the potential costs and benefits of listing vary across firms.Our research contributes to this literature by analyzing the initial listing decision.Analyzing initial listings should provide more powerful tests, since all firms must make a listing decision at the time of an IPO.The initial listing decision also involves factors, such as issue costs and parent-firm listings, that are not important in the decision to switch exchanges. 1 Our work also provides evidence related to the theoretical models of the listing decision in Foucault and Parlour (1999) and Aggarwal and Angel (1999).Foucalt and Parlour develop a model in which two exchanges compete for listings on the basis of listing fees and trading costs.Their model suggests that large IPOs will list on the exchange with lower trading costs and higher listing fees.Our findings support this prediction.Aggarwal and Angel model the tradeoff between high trading cost, high service markets and low trading cost, low service markets.They predict that small, relatively unknown firms will list on the high-cost dealer market to obtain the benefits of market-maker sponsorship.Our results provide only limited support for this model.Although small firms are more likely to list on 1 Affleck-Graves, Hegde, Miller, and Reilly (1993) also examine initial listing decisions, but focus on underpricing and exchange certification.Corwin, Harris, and Lipson (2000) analyze liquidity provision and trading activity following NYSE-listed IPOs.