Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies
分析当货币当局比财政当局更保守时，两种政策在承诺与自由裁量权下的互动。纳什均衡导致产出低于双方理想点、价格高于理想点；财政领导通常更好；货币承诺在财政自由裁量下效果被抵消，但财政承诺不会被货币自由裁量抵消。次优结果需要联合承诺或相同目标或任务完全分离。
We consider monetary-fiscal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. With both policies discretionary, (1) Nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities, (2) of the two leadership possibilities, fiscal leadership is generally better. With fiscal discretion, monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Second-best outcomes require either joint commitment, or identical targets for the two authorities—output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative—or complete separation of tasks.