Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel
构建并估计了一个定量货币DSGE模型，其中银行因代理问题而过度承担风险，发现实际利率下降会加剧风险承担，从而在通胀与利率稳定之间产生新的政策权衡。
Abstract How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.