Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates
研究当经理人受职业关注驱动时，企业集团如何配置资源。模型显示经理人会过度配置资源到更能体现其能力的部门，而所有者也会相应调整资本配置，这解释了企业社会主义和对冲行为，并指出分部报告和追踪股票的成本。
We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerates when managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisional cash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability, we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocate unobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions. Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's owners to also overallocate observable capital to the more informative divisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialism and corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segment reporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managers to distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.