Stakeholder Orientation and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from State-Level Adoption of Constituency Statutes
研究发现，美国各州采纳选区法规后，在该州注册的公司贷款利差显著下降，表明利益相关者导向能降低企业债务成本，主要通过缓解利益冲突、限制法律责任和降低收购威胁等渠道实现。
Abstract We examine the causal effect of stakeholder orientation on firms’ cost of debt. Our test exploits the staggered state-level adoption of constituency statutes, which allows directors to consider stakeholders’ interests when making business decisions. We find a significant drop in loan spreads for firms incorporated in states that adopted such statutes relative to firms incorporated elsewhere. We further show that constituency statutes reduce the cost of debt through the channels of mitigating conflicts of interest between residual and fixed claimants and between holders of liquid claims and holders of illiquid claims, limiting legal liability and lowering takeover threats.