Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation
利用28个国家10年面板数据，发现家族企业仅在劳动力市场监管较弱的地区享有绩效优势，且就业波动更小，表明家族所有权与劳动力市场改革在就业保护上存在替代关系。
Abstract In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms’ performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms. Received December 17, 2018; editorial decision April 3, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.