Monetary Policy, Endogenous Inattention and the Volatility Trade‐off
研究最优货币政策与代理人信念的互动，假设代理人通过最小化预期预测误差和信息成本来选择信息获取率，发现政策干预减少可能通过锚定预期降低产出波动，从而打破产出与价格波动之间的传统权衡。
This article considers the interaction of optimal monetary policy and agents' beliefs. We assume that agents choose their information acquisition rate by minimising a loss function that depends on expected forecast errors and information costs. "Endogenous inattention" is a Nash equilibrium in the information processing rate. Although a decline of policy activism directly increases output volatility, it indirectly anchors expectations, which decreases output volatility. If the indirect effect dominates then the usual trade-off between output and price volatility breaks down. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.