First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
研究了密封第一价格拍卖中私人信息的影响，刻画了所有信息结构和均衡下最低中标价分布，为出价和收入提供下界，并探讨了收入的上界及对价值分布识别和拍卖机制比较的意义。
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values. We also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative auction mechanisms.