Evaluating Behaviorally Motivated Policy: Experimental Evidence from the Lightbulb Market
通过理论模型和两个随机实验，研究信息不完全和注意力不足对能效标准与补贴政策的影响，发现适度补贴可能提升福利，但信息偏差本身不足以证明白炽灯禁令的合理性。
Imperfect information and inattention to energy costs are important potential motivations for energy efficiency standards and subsidies. We evaluate these motivations in the lightbulb market using a theoretical model and two randomized experiments. We derive welfare effects as functions of reduced-form sufficient statistics capturing economic and psychological parameters, which we estimate using a novel within-subject information disclosure experiment. The main results suggest that moderate subsidies for energy-efficient lightbulbs may increase welfare, but informational and attentional biases alone do not justify a ban on incandescent lightbulbs. Our results and techniques generate broader methodological insights into welfare analysis with misoptimizing consumers.