Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors
研究管理层持股与外部董事使用之间的关系，发现两者呈U型非线性关联：管理层持股低时需外部董事监督，持股高时需外部董事缓解固守效应。
This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.