Do Excess Control Rights Benefit Creditors? Evidence from Dual-Class Firms
研究发现，美国双重股权公司的内部股东超额控制权虽损害小股东，但促使公司降低经营和财务风险，从而降低借贷成本，对债权人有利。
Abstract Excess control rights by inside shareholders have been documented to hurt minority shareholders. This paper shows that such governance feature may benefit creditors. Using a sample of U.S. dual-class firms, I show that these firms take less operational and financial risk than similar single-class firms, consistent with insiders’ emphasis on long-term survival to access ongoing private control benefits. Such risk avoidance translates into lower borrowing costs for dual-class firms. Further, lenders are able to use specific covenants to prevent potential expropriations by insiders. The overall relationship between excess control rights and firm value may be less negative than previously thought.