Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes
利用佛罗里达州医疗纠纷数据，估计了不对称信息下的讨价还价模型参数，发现模型能复现数据的主要特征，并模拟了侵权改革（如限制律师费、赔偿上限）的效果。
This article uses a unique data set on medical malpractice disputes in Florida to estimate the parameters of a bargaining game with asymmetric information. The main findings of the article suggest that the bargaining game can replicate most of the qualitative and quantitative features of the data. The article also simulates alternative policy regimes to quantify the effects of possible tort reforms, such as imposing limits on contingency fees and caps on jury awards.