Negative Values in Vickrey Auctions
实验发现，当人们对商品有正负诱导价值时，第二价格拍卖中最高正价值投标者夸大收益、最低负价值投标者缩小损失，而随机第n价格拍卖能揭示真实需求但精度较低。
Some people assign negative values for new products sold on laboratory auction blocks (i.e., irradiated meat). We explore bidding behavior in two Vickrey auctions when people have positive‐ and negativeinduced values for the good. Aggregate bidding in the second‐price auction is precise but biased‐highest‐value positive bidders tend to overstate benefits, whereas lowest‐negative bidders understate losses. In contrast, bidding behavior in the random n th‐price auction is demand revealing irrespective of induced value, but it is imprecise. Examining on‐ and off‐margin bidding behavior, we cannot conclude that any segments of demand are significantly different than the demand revealing regression line.