Naked Exclusion and the Volatility of Innovation
研究发现潜在进入者的创新波动性会影响在位供应商的排他策略：波动性高时，供应商更可能选择容纳而非排他，且当波动性超过阈值时，容纳策略成为必然，这暗示反垄断机构可能无需禁止此类排他合同。
The analysis shows that the volatility of a potential entrant's innovation is an important parameter that shapes an incumbent supplier's exclusivity strategy. Higher volatility encourages the incumbent supplier to adopt an accommodation strategy rather than a pure exclusion strategy. When volatility is above a threshold, the incumbent always chooses accommodation regardless of the expected size of the entrant's innovation. And since an accommodation strategy merely redistributes surplus without blocking efficient entry, it may not warrant a prohibition of exclusivity contracts by the antitrust authorities.