Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking
用一个理论模型研究货币政策透明度，发现透明度让价格制定者更容易推断央行未来意图，使当前通胀对政策更敏感，但可能迫使央行过度关注通胀而忽视产出稳定，在央行已有低通胀信誉时反而成为政策束缚。
According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward–looking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank’s future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy–distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low–inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.