Distortion by Audit: Evidence from Public Procurement
研究发现，公共部门审计虽然重要，但会意外地降低拍卖在公共采购中的使用，减少供应商竞争，并偏向小企业、本地企业和现有企业。审计过程对拍卖的检查次数和发现的违规行为是直接合同的两倍多，导致更规范、透明的程序被机械地抑制。
Public sector audits are key to state capacity. However, they can create unintended distortions. Regression discontinuity analysis from Chile shows that audits lowered the use of auctions for public procurement, reduced supplier competition, and increased the likelihood of small, local, and incumbent firms winning contracts. Looking inside the black box of the audit process reveals that relative to comparable direct contracts, auctions underwent more than twice as many checks and led to twice as many detected infractions. These findings show that standard audit protocols can mechanically discourage the use of more regulated, complex, and transparent procedures involving more auditable steps.