Uncertainty, Opportunism, and Governance: The Effects of Volatility and Ambiguity on Formal and Relational Contracting
研究了在波动性和模糊性条件下，正式契约与关系契约在约束机会主义方面的有效性差异，发现关系契约对波动性稳健但对模糊性脆弱，正式契约则相反，挑战了关系契约能抵抗机会主义的传统观点。
Comparing the effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in constraining opportunism under conditions of volatility and ambiguity, we hypothesize that relational contracts will be robust to volatility but not to ambiguity, whereas formal contracts will be robust to ambiguity but not to volatility. Data from 125 interorganizational relationships involving R&D for new-product development support these hypotheses. Our findings suggest that formal and relational contracts each have advantages and disadvantages in specific situations and are not simply substitutes. Our results challenge the view that relational contracts are resistant to opportunism. A revised comparative governance schema is theorized for future research. © Academy of Management Journal.