Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World
基于43个国家非美国公司的样本，研究法律监管和美国机构投资者的投票是否支持有效的股东投票过程，发现投票在重要选举中具有强制性和约束力，且异议投票在投资者担心利益侵占时更多，并与更高的董事更替率和并购撤回相关。
Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 43 countries, we investigate whether laws and regulations as well as votes cast by U.S. institutional investors are consistent with an effective shareholder voting process. We find that laws and regulations allow for meaningful votes to be cast, as shareholder voting is both mandatory and binding for important elections. For votes cast, we find there is greater dissent voting when investors fear expropriation. Further, greater dissent voting is associated with higher director turnover and more M&A withdrawals. Our results suggest that shareholder voting is an effective mechanism for exercising governance around the world.