Debt Structure and Conditional Conservatism
研究了企业债务结构特征（如可转换性、证券化、优先性和私募）如何影响条件保守主义，发现与代理冲突较低的债务类型相关的企业报告更不保守，支持契约理论对债务与保守主义关系的解释。
ABSTRACT We investigate whether characteristics of firms' debt structure, beyond leverage and debt covenants, are associated with predictable variation in conditional conservatism. The contracting theory of conservatism holds that conditional conservatism is an efficient mechanism employed by an organization to address agency conflict arising from contracts with various parties. For firms with contracts that are associated with more agency conflict, the potential benefit of a conservative reporting strategy should increase. We examine the following debt contract characteristics: (1) convertibility, (2) securitization, (3) seniority, and (4) placement. We find that debt types thought to be associated with a downward shift in agency conflict (convertible, secured, senior, and private debt) are associated with less conservative reporting. Our evidence supports contracting theory as being descriptive of the link between debt and conservatism. Also, our evidence corroborates the assertion that debt contract modifications do not fully resolve lenders' demands for conservative reporting. JEL Classifications: M41; D21; D82; G14.