Geography and the Market for CEOs
研究发现美国企业招聘CEO时本地偏好远超随机水平，本地CEO薪酬更低且受当地劳动力市场影响，表明CEO市场存在区域分割而非单一全国市场。
I examine the role of geography in the market for CEOs and find that firms hire locally five times more often than expected if geography were irrelevant to the matching process. This local matching bias is widespread and exists even among the largest U.S. firms. Tests reveal that both labor supply and demand influence local matching. Compensation and unforced turnover are lower for local than for nonlocal CEOs, and the compensation of local CEOs depends on local labor market factors, unlike that of nonlocal CEOs. These findings suggest the presence of market segmentation and contrast with much of the prior literature, which explicitly or implicitly assumes a single national market. This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance.