Strategic distortions in analyst forecasts in the presence of short-term institutional investors
研究发现分析师会迎合短期投资者发布乐观目标价，导致股票暂时高估，短期机构投资者借此将持股卖给散户，而迎合行为在无投行部门的券商中更常见。
We document that analysts cater to short-term investors by issuing optimistic target prices. Catering dominates among analysts at brokers without an investment banking arm as they face lower reputational cost. The market does not see through the analyst catering activity and their forecasts lead to temporary stock overpricing that short-term institutional investors exploit to offload their holdings to retail traders. We also report evidence consistent with catering brokers being rewarded with more future trades channelled through them. Our study identifies a new source of conflicts of interest in analyst research originating from the ownership composition of a stock.