The Labor Market for Bankers and Regulators
构建了一个劳动力市场模型，分析不同能力的人选择成为银行家或金融监管者的决策，发现银行家平均技能更高且薪酬与业绩更挂钩，金融繁荣期银行会从监管领域挖走最优秀人才，导致不当行为增加。
We propose a labor market model in which agents with heterogenous ability levels choose to work as bankers or as financial regulators. When workers extract intrinsic benefits from working in regulation (such as public-sector motivation or human capital accumulation), our model jointly predicts that bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation is more sensitive to performance. During financial booms, banks draw the best workers away from the regulatory sector and misbehavior increases. In a dynamic extension of our model, young regulators accumulate human capital and the best ones switch to banking in mid-career.