Job Protection versus Contracts At‐Will: Trading‐Off Entrenchment and Shirking
比较了提供工作保护的合同与自由雇佣合同，发现自由雇佣合同能更廉价地激励员工不偷懒，但可能导致员工采取机会主义行为让自己变得不可或缺（固守）。模型暗示高级管理者应获得更多保护。
Abstract I compare two types of employment contracts: those offering job protection and at‐will contracts. Their respective performances reveal the following trade‐off: at‐will contracts provide cheaper incentives for agents not to shirk, but they can induce the opportunistic actions of agents to make themselves less dispensable (“entrenchment”). One implication of the model is that more senior managers, such as chief executive officers, should receive more protection, for example, through contracts that are explicitly not at‐will or contracts that specify a longer duration.