杠杆与止赎危机

Leverage and the Foreclosure Crisis

Journal of Political Economy · 2015
被引 207
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了住房繁荣期间大量高杠杆抵押贷款对止赎危机的影响,通过模型模拟发现,危机前高杠杆贷款的增加可解释止赎率上升的60%以上。

Abstract

How much of the foreclosure crisis can be explained by the large number of high-leverage mortgages originated during the housing boom? In our model, heterogeneous households select from mortgages with different down payments and choose whether to default given income and housing shocks. The use of low-down payment loans is initially limited by payment-to-income requirements but becomes unrestricted during the boom. The model approximates key housing and mortgage market facts before and after the crisis. A counterfactual experiment suggests that the increased number of high-leverage loans originated prior to the crisis can explain over 60 percent of the rise in foreclosure rates.

杠杆率止赎危机住房贷款违约