PiracyVersusMonopoly In the Market for Conspicuous Consumption
研究了奢侈品作为收入信号时，垄断能有效传递信号，而盗版竞争迫使消费者购买更多或更高质量来传递相同信号，造成资源浪费，并分析了信号传递与盗版激励之间的权衡。
When luxury purchases signal the incomes of buyers, a monopoly will deliver signals efficiently. If in contrast competitors sell counterfeit copies of luxury goods at low prices, consumers will have to buy larger quantities or higher qualities to transmit the same signals, which wastes resources. Competition does maximal harm when entrants produce indistinguishable replicas of existing luxury goods since prices will fall the furthest. The delivery of signals presents a trade-off: goods with a large gap between marginal cost and the price a monopoly would charge signal efficiently but those large gaps increase the reward to counterfeiting. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.