Analyst Coverage, Information, and Bubbles
研究中国2007年股市泡沫，发现分析师覆盖越多的股票泡沫越小，但分析师意见分歧会削弱这一效果，表明分析师通过协调投资者信念来抑制泡沫。
Abstract We examine the 2007 stock market bubble in China. Using multiple measures of bubble intensity for each stock, we find significantly smaller bubbles in stocks for which there is greater analyst coverage. We further show that the abating effect of analyst coverage on bubble intensity is weaker when there is greater disagreement among analysts. This suggests that, in line with resale option theories of bubbles, one channel through which analyst coverage may mitigate bubbles is by coordinating investors’ beliefs and thus reducing its dispersion. Stock turnover provides further evidence consistent with this particular information mechanism.