Do Termination Provisions Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?
利用美国证券交易委员会文件构建的新数据库，准确衡量了收购交易中终止条款的发生率和竞争深度，发现终止条款与收购竞争正相关，支持信息/承诺假说，即终止条款不会截断竞价，而是结束收购过程。
We provide new evidence on termination provisions and the takeover bidding process. Our central contribution is a novel database from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents that accurately measures the incidence of termination provisions and the depth of competition in takeover deals. We show that biased data in prior research produced incorrect conclusions on the relation between termination provisions and judicial decisions, bidder toeholds, and deal size. Our comprehensive data also show that termination provisions are positively related to takeover competition. Our evidence is consistent with the information/commitment hypothesis in which termination provisions do not truncate bidding but instead culminate the takeover process.