Quiet Life No More? Corporate Bankruptcy and Bank Competition
利用印度银行业改革带来的区域竞争差异，研究发现银行竞争加剧后，更多企业申请资产保护、破产时间缩短、重组增多而清算减少，表明竞争促使债权人更积极追讨欠款。
Pursuing delinquent borrowers requires considerable effort, and creditors may lack the incentive to exert this costly effort in uncompetitive banking sectors. To examine this, we use a uniquely large data set of public and private corporate bankruptcy filings spanning a banking-sector reform that deregulated bank entry across different regions of India. We find that increased banking competition is associated with more firms seeking a stay on assets, a decline in bankruptcy duration, and a shift toward workouts rather than liquidations. The results are consistent with creditors exerting greater effort to pursue delinquent firms and resolve bankruptcies more quickly when competition increases.