Effect of Concession‐Timing Strategies in Auditor–Client Negotiations: It Matters Who Is Using Them
通过实验研究审计师与客户谈判中不同让步时机策略的效果，发现策略效果取决于使用方：审计师使用“最后让步”策略更有效，而财务经理使用“一开始让步”策略更有效，“逐步让步”策略对双方都有效。
Abstract In this study, we examine how norms about the use of negotiation strategies by different parties in an auditor–client negotiation influence the relative efficacies of these negotiation strategies. We conduct an experiment with experienced auditors/financial managers as participants, who enter into a negotiation on an income‐decreasing audit adjustment with a hypothetical client/auditor who uses a strategy where the same concessions are given either at the start, gradually, or the end of the negotiation. We find that the concession‐end strategy is more effective than the concession‐start strategy when used by auditors; however, the reverse is true when these same strategies are used by financial managers. The concession‐gradual strategy leads to superior outcomes when used by either auditors or clients. We also provide evidence that auditors’ and financial managers’ perceptions of the norms relating to the use of these strategies correspond to what we propose in our theory.