The Role of Agents in Private Entrepreneurial Finance
研究了中介在私人市场创业融资中的作用，发现中介能吸引更多投资者、拓宽地理和资本基础，并增加易受信息不对称影响的投资者比例，且能力更强的中介带来更大价值。
We examine theory and evidence on agents in private–market entrepreneurial financings. After controlling for the endogenous issuer–agent matching and a whole host of other controls, the empirical findings in this paper indicate that agents attract more investors, broaden the geographic investor and capital base, and increase the percentage of investors and capital from investors that are more vulnerable to the costs of information asymmetry. We also find that more capable agents generally provide more valuable benefits to private entrepreneurial firm financings than less capable agents, and that increasing the number of agents in a financing further increases value to issuing firms.