Contracts as a Barrier to Entry in Markets with Nonpivotal Buyers
研究了在位企业利用解约费阻止更高效潜在进入者的反竞争效应，发现解约费总能盈利性地阻止进入，禁止解约费对消费者有利，且除非进入者效率与在位者相近，否则能提高总福利。
Considering markets with nonpivotal buyers, we analyze the anticompetitive effects of breakup fees used by an incumbent facing a more efficient entrant in the future. Buyers differ in their intrinsic switching costs. Breakup fees are profitably used to foreclose entry, regardless of the entrant's efficiency advantage or level of switching costs. Banning breakup fees is beneficial to consumers. The ban enhances the total welfare unless the entrant's efficiency is close to the incumbent's. Inefficient foreclosure arises not because of rent shifting from the entrant, but because the incumbent uses a long-term contract to manipulate consumers' expected surplus from not signing it.