Bank capital buffers in a dynamic model
通过估计动态结构性银行模型，研究了风险加权资本充足率与未加权杠杆要求对银行贷款和股权缓冲积累的不同影响，发现更严格的杠杆要求反而能降低银行倒闭率。
Abstract We estimate a dynamic structural banking model to examine the interaction between risk‐weighted capital adequacy and unweighted leverage requirements, their differential impact on bank lending, and equity buffer accumulation in excess of regulatory minima. Tighter risk‐weighted capital requirements reduce loan supplies and lead to an endogenous fall in bank profitability, reducing bank incentives to accumulate equity buffers and, therefore, increasing the incidence of bank failure. Alternatively, tighter leverage requirements increase lending, preserve bank charter value, and incentives to accumulate equity buffers leading to lower bank failure rates.