Global Board Reforms and the Pricing of IPOs
研究发现全球董事会改革显著降低了IPO的抑价程度，对代理问题严重的公司影响更大，而声誉中介认证、信息披露充分及股东保护完善的国家中改革效果减弱。
Abstract We document that global board reforms are associated with a significant reduction in the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). The effect is amplified for IPOs with greater agency problems and mitigated for IPOs certified by reputable intermediaries, IPOs with greater disclosure specificity, and IPOs in countries with better shareholder protection and stringent financial reporting regulations. Furthermore, global board reforms have led to an improvement in the long-term market performance, proceeds, and subscription level of IPOs and have enhanced board independence in the issuing firms. Our findings suggest that global board reforms have strengthened board oversight in the issuing firms, leading to less underpriced IPOs.