耐用品垄断企业对低成本技术的最优压制

The Optimal Suppression of a Low-Cost Technology by a Durable-Good Monopoly

RAND Journal of Economics · 1996
被引 37
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

耐用品垄断企业面对两种已知技术时,只会使用低产量下平均成本最低的技术;若消费者只知已用技术,企业可能先使用劣等技术以增加利润,再秘密切换至高效技术。

Abstract

If a durable-good monopoly can use either of two technologies whose properties are known to consumers, the monopoly uses only the technology with the lowest average cost at low levels of production. If consumers know only about technologies in use, the monopoly may use an inferior technology initially to increase its profits, keeping the new, efficient technology secret and switching later. Thus, in either case, an inferior technology may be used; however, switching between technologies occurs only if consumers are not fully informed about both technologies.

耐用品垄断低成本技术抑制技术切换消费者信息不完全