Bundling and Competition for Slots
研究多个卖家向拥有k个插槽的买家销售多种不同产品时的竞争，发现独立定价下纯策略均衡常不存在且混合策略均衡无效率，而允许捆绑销售时存在高效的“技术租赁”均衡，且捆绑常增加买家剩余。
We consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having k slots. Under independent pricing, a pure strategy equilibrium often does not exist, and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never efficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products, and an efficient “technology-renting” equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned, all equilibria are efficient. Comparing the mixed-strategy equilibrium with the technology-renting equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyer's surplus. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.