Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance
利用对冲基金数据库，研究发现经理人激励（如期权式激励费合约的delta、经理人持股、高水位线条款）和自由裁量权（如锁定期、通知期、赎回期较长）与基金业绩正相关，但激励费率本身不能解释业绩差异。
ABSTRACT Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option‐like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high‐water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data‐related biases.