Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects
研究两个专有网络之间的动态价格竞争，分析对称均衡的存在性与唯一性、定价函数单调性、网络规模动态及企业价值，并应用于无线通信的终止收费监管分析。
I consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks. Consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate, and firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices. I derive a series of results pertaining to (a) existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria, (b) monotonicity of the pricing function (<it>e.g.</it> larger networks set higher prices), (c) network size dynamics (increasing dominance vs. reversion to the mean), and (d) firm value (how it varies with network effects). Finally, I apply my general framework to the study of termination charges in wireless telecommunications. I consider various forms of regulation and examine their impact on firm profits and market share dynamics.