Learning about analysts
研究有职业顾虑的分析师向交易者提供廉价谈话建议，交易者拥有分析师能力的私人信息，导致声誉内生性问题，分析均衡中市场能否最终识别分析师类型。
We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's ability. The recommendations of the analyst influence asset prices that are then used to evaluate the analyst. An endogeneity problem thus arises. In particular, if the reputation of the analyst is sufficiently high then an incompetent but strategic analyst is able to momentarily hide her type. An equilibrium in which the market eventually learns the analyst type always exists. However, under some conditions, an equilibrium also exists in which the incompetent analyst is able to hide her type forever.